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Abstract 
 
This dissertation presents a new set of algorithms and architecture for 
implementation of a real-time adaptive integrity monitor for a Local Area 
Augmentation System (LAAS) that utilizes navigation system vertical error in a 
feedback loop to deterministically set the broadcast integrity parameter σpr_gnd.  
This unique method for deterministically assessing the error of the ground 
subsystem of LAAS in real-time and adapting the broadcast integrity parameter σpr_gnd, 
rather than using current probabilistic models of predicted worst case scenarios to 
generate a static value of σpr_gnd, provides an increase in system integrity. As a result of 
the increase in system integrity, an additional benefit of increased system availability is 
achieved. 
 The research presented in this dissertation demonstrates that the new 
methodology implemented by the adaptive integrity monitor can deliver performance 
improvements in both integrity and availability of the LAAS Signal-In-Space.
1 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
To meet required navigation system performance for precision approach and 
landing using the Global Positioning System (GPS), augmentation to the position 
solution provided by standard GPS is required. The augmentation of GPS by utilizing 
ground based reference receivers to calculate errors specific to a given airport, and 
broadcasting these error corrections to a specified local coverage area (approximately a 
20-30 mile radius), is referred to as a Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS).  
The United States implementation of GBAS is known as Local Area Augmentation 
System (LAAS). According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), LAAS is 
intended to provide accuracy, integrity and continuity adequate to support all phases 
and categories of precision navigation, including CAT I, CAT II and CAT III precision 
approach and landing requirements. 
Currently LAAS is only capable of supporting CAT I approach and landing 
which requires a maximum permissible integrity risk of 2x10
-7
 in a 150 sec interval with 
a vertical alert limit of 10m, according to the Minimum Aviation System Performance 
Standards (MASPS) for LAAS. 
While LAAS has demonstrated the ability to provide accuracy less than one 
meter in both the horizontal and vertical directions, which would be more than 
sufficient for CAT II and CAT III approaches, LAAS has challenges meeting the 
rigorous requirements for integrity, which are 1x10
-9
in any 15 second interval in the 
vertical direction, and 1x10
-9
 in any 30 sec interval in the horizontal direction, 
according to the MASPS.  
2 
One of the primary reasons that integrity requirements for CAT II and CAT III 
approaches have remained difficult to achieve is the uncertainty in the error associated 
with the ground subsystem of LAAS.  
In the current LAAS specification this error is quantified by the broadcast 
parameter σpr_gnd. The broadcast σpr_gnd is defined by the FAA as the standard deviation 
of a normal distribution that bounds the Signal-In-Space contribution to the error in the 
corrected pseudorange at the GBAS reference point. It further describes σpr_gnd as 
accounting for all equipment and environmental effects, including the received signal 
power, the local interference environment and any transient error in smoothing filter 
output, relative to steady-state, caused by ionospheric divergence. In summary σpr_gnd 
encompasses all the error associated with the ground subsystem of LAAS. 
 To date a great deal of research has been accomplished on the probabilistic 
error and risk models to quantify σpr_gnd [12, 13, 14, 16, 17]. As a result of this research, 
current LAAS ground subsystems set σpr_gnd to a static value that has been determined 
using these probabilistic models. Typically, σpr_gnd is artificially inflated as a means of 
increasing the position error bounds and ensuring integrity for the worst-case scenario. 
This approach assumes the chosen threat model properly describes and bounds the 
system.  
Another short coming of the current LAAS architecture, as it relates to σpr_gnd 
determination, is its inability to adapt in real-time to environmental change, because the 
LAAS architecture is an open-loop architecture. 
Current LAAS architecture refers to the Honeywell SmartPath SLS 4000 
system.  This system is the currently the only certified CAT I system used for operation 
3 
under DO-217 with DO-278 software standards and DO-254 hardware standards being 
applied to the system’s certification. The SLS 4000 has been deployed at several 
airports in the United States. To date these installations have not been open to general 
aviation use due to failure to meet integrity and continuity requirements set forth by the 
FAA. It is with this in mind that this research effort was initiated. 
 To overcome the limitations of modeling all possible worst-case scenarios that a 
LAAS ground subsystem might encounter, the research described in this dissertation 
provides a new method for preforming sensitivity analysis of σpr_gnd as it relates to 
Navigation System Error and system availability. The research presented also describes 
a novel approach to addressing the determination of σpr_gnd by utilizing the results of the 
sensitivity analysis to construct a real-time closed-loop adaptive filter that can 
deterministically calculate the error in the LAAS corrections as it relates to LAAS 
ground subsystem error. This real-time closed-loop adaptive filter can deterministically 
set σpr_gnd to compensate for LAAS ground subsystem errors without over-bounding the 
navigation solution, thus increasing integrity without compromising accuracy or 
availability.  
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Chapter 2 Background 
2.1 Satellite Navigation Overview 
In the last ten years, the capabilities of satellite navigation for use in aircraft 
navigation has been expanded to more demanding phases of flight, in particular vertical 
guidance down to 200 ft. [1]. This expanded role of satellite navigation relies heavily on 
the Global Position System (GPS) and various systems that augment standard GPS. 
The vertical accuracy of standard GPS position solutions is bounded by 
approximately 22 meters with 95% confidence [2], which is not considered adequate for 
some phases of aircraft operation, namely terminal area functions such as takeoff and 
landing.  As a result the need exists to augment standard GPS to provide improved 
location accuracy during takeoff and landing. The development of differential GPS 
(DGPS) techniques to augment standard GPS has significantly improved the accuracy 
of GPS position solutions allowing terminal area navigation. There are multiple 
implementations of differential GPS. One type of DGPS is a ground-based 
augmentation system (GBAS) that utilizes multiple ground-based reference receivers at 
known locations to determine local GPS error and provide the necessary GPS 
corrections for a service area. This type of Ground Based Augmentation System is also 
referred to as a Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) and thus the two terms are 
used interchangeably. The intent of LAAS is to provide differential range corrections 
and integrity (i.e. safety) information for a local airport area (approximately a 20-30 
mile radius) thus allowing precision approach, departure, and other terminal area 
operations. Furthermore the expectation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
is that LAAS can provide the quality of service required by the Minimum Aviation 
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System Performance Standards (MASPS)[3], functioning as a sole-means aircraft 
navigation system for a local airport area. 
One of the major concerns surrounding the implementation of LAAS is the 
possibility of transmitting a LAAS signal-in-space (SIS) that contains Hazardous 
Misleading Information (HMI).   HMI is defined as any information that results in a 
navigation system error that exceeds the specified alert limit for the selected LAAS 
service level without alerting the user in the time-to-alert. 
Current methods for mitigating HMI are focused around probabilistic modeling 
and integrity broadcast parameter inflation that over-bounds the navigation system 
based on proposed worst-case-scenarios [5, 12].  This approach to integrity monitoring 
has the side effect of reducing system availability. The research in this paper describes a 
real-time analysis and implementation of an adaptive integrity algorithm based on the 
LAAS system conceptualized in [4]. The research determines the feasibility of a new 
and novel way to control system integrity, based on real-time evaluation of the LAAS 
environment without over-bounding the system and reducing availability. 
 
2.2 Global Positioning System 
2.2.1 GPS Theory 
The fundamental technique used in GPS positioning is that of satellite ranging. Satellite 
ranging relies on calculating the distance from a user receiver to multiple satellites 
whose positions are known. Satellite ranging requires a minimum of three satellites to 
calculate the position of the user receiver.  The distance to each satellite is calculated by 
receiving unique timing codes from each of the three satellites and calculating the time 
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it took for each timing code to travel from the satellite to the receiver antenna.  These 
timing codes travel at approximately the speed of light (3 x 10
8
 m/s); therefore if the 
travel time, Tt (s), is known the distance can be calculated from the following equation.  
These calculated distances are referred to as pseudoranges. 
 
Distance (m) = Tt * 3 x 10
8
 m/s  Eq. 1 
 
Because the travel time is a calculated value, it is susceptible to several different types 
of errors. For this reason it is often necessary to correct for these errors when the user 
requires a precise position measurement.  
 With one calculated distance the receiver knows that it is located somewhere on 
the surface of an imaginary sphere that is centered on the satellite whose distance is 
known, as depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 Position from one satellite 
 
A second distance measurement to a different satellite refines the unknown position. 
This second measurement generates a second sphere that intersects the first. The 
intersection of two spheres is a circle; therefore the receiver must lie on a circle as 
shown in Figure 2.  A distance measurement from a third satellite narrows the position 
to two points on a circle as depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 2 Position from two satellites 
Position 1 Position 2
 
Figure 3 Position from three satellites 
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A fourth measurement can uniquely identify the location of the unknown position. 
However, if the desired position is constrained to near the earth’s surface then one of 
the two calculated positions can be discarded because it will furnish the receiver with a 
position that is not a reasonable solution (i.e. thousands of kilometers away from the 
earth), while the other position will be near the earth’s surface [20]. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4 below. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Unreasonable GPS Ranging Solution 
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2.2.2 GPS Implementation 
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a space based navigation system 
consisting of three major segments: Space Segment, Control Segment, and User 
Segment. The Space Segment consists of a constellation of satellites referred to as the 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) [5].  The Control Segment monitors the 
health, timing, and ephemeris of each satellite and uploads corrections and adjustments 
at regular intervals. The User Segment (or Airborne Segment) consists of a user 
receiver, which can receive and decode the satellite transmissions. 
The GNSS constellation is comprised of six orbital planes, each containing four 
or more satellites equally spaced within the plane. Each orbital plane is at an 
approximate inclination angle of 50-60° to the equator.  This spacing ensures that a 
minimum of four satellites can be viewed from any point on the earth’s surface at any 
given time. Each satellite transmits a pseudorandom code (PRN code) that can be used 
for position measurements. The PRN code incorporates a unique identifier, a time-
stamp, and orbital parameters, known as ephemeris [6].  
A GPS receiver typically has multiple channels allowing it to track several 
different in-view satellites that can be used for navigation. GPS navigation is based on 
satellite ranging: position is determined by measuring the distance from a receiver to all 
in-view of satellites based on the duration of each transmission to the user. 
 Each of these distance measurements are referred to as a pseudorange because 
they are not directly measured but instead are calculated. The receiver obtains the range 
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to a satellite vehicle (SV) by measuring the difference between satellite PRN code 
transmit time and the user receive time of the corresponding PRN code and multiplying 
the time difference by the speed of light. Given four pseudoranges from separate SVs 
the three dimensional position of the user receiver can be calculated. The need for four 
pseudoranges arises because there are 4 unknown parameters associated with the 
position calculation: latitude, longitude, altitude and time. The unknown time parameter 
is the difference between the GPS clock and the user receiver clock.  This time 
difference, or clock bias, can be resolved by adding a fourth satellite and solving the 
four equations and four unknowns. 
 The specified performance of the GPS Standard Positioning Service as it relates 
to the average position domain accuracy using only the signal in space without any 
augmentation is a follows: 
 Horizontal Error: ≤ 9 meters 95% (All-in-View satellites) 
 Vertical Error:  ≤ 15 meters 95% (All-in-View satellites) 
 This specification does not include errors due to the atmosphere, multipath, or 
user equipment and is based on a global average [18]. 
 
2.3 GPS Error Sources 
There are several sources of error associated with GPS navigation. These error 
sources can generally be categorized as follows: satellite and receiver clock 
inaccuracies, ephemeris error, and signal propagation delays. 
Since the pseudorange calculations are based on transmit and receive time any 
discrepancy in the satellite and receiver clocks will introduce error into the position 
13 
solution.  Typically, most clock error is a result of the receiver clock not being as 
accurate as the atomic clock that is used in the satellite. This difference in clock 
accuracy is considered constant and can usually be accounted for in a position solution 
model. 
Because satellites drift slightly from their predicted orbits, their exact position 
relative to the earth is not always known.  This uncertainty in position can lead to errors 
in the receiver’s position calculations and is referred to as ephemeris error. Ephemeris 
error is typically represented as a relatively constant bias that can be modeled and 
removed from the position calculations. 
GPS signal propagation delays are a more variable source of error. One source 
of signal propagation delay is the atmosphere, specifically the ionosphere and 
troposphere.   
The ionosphere, which is the atmospheric layer located from approximately 80 
to 500 kilometers above the earth’s surface, contains a large number of free electrons. 
These electrons appear opaque to the radio waves and therefore cause the signals 
transmitted from the GNSS satellites to deflect from a straight line path introducing a 
delay in the signal.  
The troposphere, the layer of the atmosphere from ground level to 
approximately 80 kilometers above the earth’s surface, is also a source of interference.  
The troposphere is a non-dispersive medium and its effect on the GNSS signal is an 
extra delay in the measurement of the signal traveling from the satellite to the receiver 
[27]. The delay introduced by the troposphere is dependent on the temperature, pressure 
and humidity. These factors result in a non-dispersive medium with respect to 
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electromagnetic waves. The result of the non-dispersive medium is an equal delay to the 
code and carrier, in contrast to the ionosphere. 
Another source of propagation delay is referred to as multipath. Multipath is a 
result of incoming GPS signals deflecting off of terrestrial objects such as mountains, 
buildings, large antennas and other obstacles near the user receiver. This deflection in 
the signal adds a delay to the signal, thus negatively impacting the position calculation. 
2.4 Differential GPS 
Differential GPS is a method by which GPS signals that contain errors may be 
augmented to improve the quality of the position solution.  Differential GPS relies on 
the use of a GPS reference receiver at a known location in the vicinity of a user receiver 
that allows common errors to both receivers to be determined and removed from the 
user receiver’s position solution [7]. Because each user receiver may use a different 
method of calculating position, the corrections provided by DGPS are given in the range 
domain.    
The reference receiver is a stationary receiver whose exact position is known by 
means of a precise survey.  This reference receiver measures the range to each in-view 
satellite vehicle (SV).  The measured ranges include the actual range to each satellite in 
addition to the errors discussed previously and is referred to as a pseudorange.  
A second range is calculated using the known location (surveyed position) of the 
reference receiver and the ephemeris based satellite position. This computed range is 
referred to as the expected range. The expected range and the measured range can then 
be compared to determine the error in measured pseudorange.   
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If a user receiver and the reference receiver are using the same set of SVs, the 
satellite clock error and ephemeris error are common and, to a large degree, the signal 
propagation errors are common.  Thus the calculated error can be applied to the 
measured range of the remote GPS user receiver and improve position accuracy. This 
correction is referred to as a pseudorange correction. 
  As the distance between the two receivers increases a decorrelation in the 
receiver errors occurs, thus limiting the effectiveness of the reference receiver to a 
service area of approximately 100 nm [7]. 
2.5 Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) 
2.5.1 LAAS Overview 
Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) is intended to provide radio 
navigation for aviation Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) precision approaches and landings 
from approximately 20nm from the runway threshold, through touchdown and rollout. 
In addition, LAAS is intended to be suitable for precision navigation in the terminal 
area including curved approaches and departures and for surface navigation on the 
airport [8]. 
The basic principle of LAAS is that pseudorange observations made by ground-
based receivers are used to develop differential corrections for each satellite. These 
corrections are provided to the airborne user’s receiver via a VHF data broadcast 
(VDB). The airborne receiver then applies these corrections in order to produce a set of 
corrected pseudoranges that are then the basis of a position solution. The underlying 
assumption is that, for relatively short separations between the ground-based reference 
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receivers and the airborne-based user receivers, the most significant error sources will 
be common to both receivers and will therefore be eliminated by differential processing. 
Although never observed, it has been opined by researchers that it is possible 
that in the distance separating the airborne receiver and the reference receiver a 
waveform can occur that is a moving front in the ionosphere that is traveling at the same 
speed as the airplane and in the same direction as the airplane, and is between the 
airborne platform and the reference receiver.  This front, referred to as an evil 
waveform, can cause the reference receiver pseudorange corrections to be correct for 
the ground station but in error for the airborne platform [12, 16, 17].  It is for this reason 
that a LAAS station should have an off-site navigator, similar to the OU LAAS 
implementation.  This remote navigator is capable of observing the same pierce points 
as the airborne receiver and can alert the ground station and the airborne platform of the 
hazard of such a waveform.  Since such a waveform has never been observed at any 
point on the globe at any time, since the implementation of GPS, it is believed that this 
threat is very remote but can be mitigated by the remote monitor such as found only on 
the OU LAAS implementation. 
Figure 5 illustrates a typical LAAS, which consists of three main components: 
space segment, airborne segment, and ground segment. The space segment for LAAS 
consists of the GNSS satellites. The airborne segment consists of a LAAS enabled GPS 
receiver. The ground segment is typically composed of the following three components:  
1.) A minimum of three precisely surveyed ground reference stations that 
transmit pseudoranges and other relevant GPS information to the central processing 
facility. 
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2.) A central processing facility, referred to as the base station, which receives 
pseudoranges from all reference stations and uses these pseudoranges to compute 
estimates of the pseudorange corrections for each satellite signal observed by the 
reference receivers. The central processing facility also monitors the signal integrity and 
computes parameters for each satellite that the user may use to determine the 
availability of the signal in space for a desired level of service and a given satellite 
geometry [9].  
3.) A VHF data broadcast transmitter (VDB) that will broadcast the psuedorange 
corrections, integrity information, and reference path information to the local area in the 
108.0-117.975 MHz band.  
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2.5.2 LAAS Signal-In-Space 
LAAS performance is often characterized by the performance of the “Signal-In-
Space” (SIS). The SIS performance is defined in terms of integrity, availability, 
continuity, and accuracy. 
Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in correctness of the 
information supplied by the system and its ability to provide timely warnings to users 
when the system should not be used for navigation as a result of errors or failures in the 
system [3]. Availability is the ability of the navigation system to provide the required 
function and performance at the initiation of the intended operation (take-off, landing, 
curved path approach, etc.).  
Figure 5 Local Area Augmentation System 
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For the LAAS Approach Service, the short-term system availability shall be at 
least 95%, according to the Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards. 
Continuity of the system is the ability for the navigation system to provide the required 
function and performance throughout the entirety of the operation without interruption. 
Accuracy is the statistical difference, at a 95% probability, between the measured 
position and known (surveyed) position at any point within the service volume [10, 23].  
Current LAAS implementations achieve horizontal accuracy on the order of 1m with 
95% confidence and 1.5m with 95% confidence in the vertical direction. Figures 6 and 
7 illustrate the achievable accuracy improvement in horizontal and vertical accuracy of 
LAAS compared to standard GPS navigation. These nominal accuracy numbers easily 
meet the accuracy requirements in both the vertical and horizontal direction set forth by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to support category I (CAT I) 
operations. However, the challenge for LAAS implementations is meeting the integrity 
requirements [9]. Current LAAS implementations rely on probabilistic modeling to 
predict if possible error sources will cause the calculated pseudorange corrections to fail 
the minimum integrity requirements established by the FAA. 
20 
 
Figure 6 Horizontal Error GPS vs LAAS 
 
 
Figure 7  Vertical Error GPS vs LAAS 
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2.5.3 LAAS Error Sources 
LAAS relies on the assumption that error sources encountered by the aircraft 
receiver and the reference receivers are nearly the same. These errors include ephemeris 
error, satellite clock error, receiver clock error, and atmospheric error. Ephemeris and 
clock errors are small contributors to the total error budget, and expected to be zero-
mean random processes. Furthermore, satellite clock errors and ephemeris errors are 
certain to be common to all in-view users [6]. GNSS signal delay caused by the 
atmosphere, more specifically the ionosphere, is the largest error source for GNSS 
users, but this error is typically mitigated by applying the LAAS broadcast pseudorange 
corrections. This mitigation is dependent on the fact that atmospheric delays are highly 
correlated between the reference receivers and the user receiver. Decorrelation of the 
error sources between reference receivers and the user receiver are potential sources of 
Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI) because they are incorporated into the LAAS 
error correction transmission to the aircraft.  The ability to determine these conditions 
and provide a timely warning to the user, indicating the system should not be used for 
navigation as a result of the errors, is referred to as integrity monitoring. Integrity 
information warns of unsafe satellites or conditions and provides a means for aircraft to 
reliably bound their position errors to the probabilities required for aviation safety [11]. 
These position bounds are referred to as vertical and horizontal protection limits (VPL 
and HPL, respectively) and are calculated at the aircraft [15]. Horizontal protection 
limit is also referred to as Lateral Protection Limit (LPL) and the two terms are used 
synonymously throughout this document. 
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2.5.4 LAAS Integrity 
In LAAS the quantitative calculation of navigation integrity is accomplished by 
calculating both vertical and horizontal protection limits at the aircraft. These limits are 
position bounds that have an associated set of integrity risk parameters based on the 
categorization of approach within a specific GBAS service level (GSL). The two 
primary integrity parameters that are used in the quantitative evaluation of LAAS 
integrity are vertical and lateral alert limits (VAL and LAL, respectively) and are stated 
in Table 1, following. A description of the typical operations for each of the GBAS 
service levels referenced in Table 1 can be found in Table 2.  
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 Accuracy Integrity Continuity 
GBAS 
Service  
Level 
Lateral 
NSE 
Accurac
y 95% 
Vertical 
NSE 
Accurac
y 95% 
Integrity 
Probability 
Time 
to 
Alert 
Lateral 
Alert 
Limit 
Vertical 
Alert 
Limit 
Continuity 
Probability 
GSL A 16.0 m 
 (52 ft.) 
20.0 m  
(66 ft.) 
1-2x10
-7
in 
any 150 sec 
10s 40.0 m  
(130 ft.) 
50 m  
(160 ft.) 
1-8x10
-6
in 
any 15 sec 
GSL B 5.0 m  
(16 ft.) 
8.0 m 
(26 ft.) 
1-2x10
-7
in 
any 150 sec 
6s 40.0 m  
(130 ft.) 
20 m  
(66 ft.) 
1-8x10
-6
in 
any 15 sec 
GSL C 16.0 m  
(52 ft.) 
4.0 m  
(13 ft.) 
1-2x10
-7
in 
any 150 sec 
6s 
 
40.0 m  
(130 ft.) 
10 m  
(33 ft.) 
1-8x10
-6
in 
any 15 sec 
GSL D 5.0 m 
(16 ft.) 
2.9 m  
(10 ft.) 
1-1x10
-9
in 
any 15 sec 
vertical, 30 
sec lateral 
2s 17 m  
(56 ft.) 
10 m  
(33 ft.) 
1-8x10
-6
in 
any 15 sec 
GSL E 5.0 m 
(16 ft.) 
2.9 m  
(10 ft.) 
1-1x10
-9
in 
any 15 sec 
vertical, 30 
sec lateral 
2s 17 m  
(56 ft.) 
10 m  
(33 ft.) 
1-4x10
-6
in 
any 15 sec 
GSL F 5.0 m 
(16 ft.) 
2.9 m  
(10 ft.) 
1-1x10
-9
in 
any 15 sec 
vertical, 30 
sec lateral 
2s 17 m  
(56 ft.) 
10 m  
(33 ft.) 
1-2x10
-6
in 
any 15 sec 
vertical and 
1-2x10
-6
in 
any 30 sec 
lateral 
Table 1 LAAS Service Performance Requirements 
 
GBAS 
Service 
Level 
Typical operation(s) which may be supported by the is level of service 
A Approach operations with vertical guidance (performance of APV-I 
designation) 
B Approach operations with vertical guidance (performance of APV-II 
designation) 
C Precision Approach to lowest Category I minima 
D Precision Approach to lowest Category IIIb minima, when augmented 
with other airborne equipment 
E Precision Approach to lowest Category II/IIIa minima 
F Precision Approach to lowest Category IIIb minima 
 
Table 2 GBAS Service Levels for Approach Service 
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In the LAAS architecture, during approach, the airborne navigation subsystem is 
required to perform integrity analysis by computing VPL and HPL. The computed 
protection levels will be compared to the appropriate alert limits for the selected GSL. 
The airborne sub-system will then indicate if either the HPL or VPL exceeds the alert 
limit. Typically this is done by full scale deflection of either the horizontal or vertical 
needle of the course deviation indicator (CDI). Additionally the horizontal and/or 
vertical flag of the CDI will be displayed indicating the alert limit has been exceeded. 
These computed protection levels incorporate integrity data transmitted from the 
LAAS ground station to the aircraft. These integrity data, referred to as integrity 
broadcast parameters, represent estimated errors in the system. These estimated errors 
are represented by B values and Sigma Pseudorange Ground (σpr_gnd).  
The B-values represent pseudorange correction differences across reference 
receivers. Ideally, the pseudorange corrections from all reference receivers should be 
the same for a given satellite [19].  
Sigma Pseudorange Ground (σpr_gnd) is defined in [8] as having the purpose of 
accounting for all equipment and environmental effects, including the received signal 
power, the local interference environment, and any transient error in smoothing filter 
output, relative to steady-state, caused by ionospheric divergence for each ranging 
source (reference receiver). 
It can be seen in equations 3, 4, 8 and 9 below that these integrity broadcast 
parameters impact the computation of VPL and HPL and therefore impact overall 
integrity of the system.  
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Due to the wide variety of errors represented by σpr_gnd it is difficult to quantify 
this integrity parameter. The guidance provided by [8] for quantifying this parameter is 
as follows: 
The broadcast σpr_gnd shall be such that the LAAS service availability, as defined 
in Section 2.3.3.2 of RTCA/DO-245A, for a nominal 24 satellite constellation described 
in the GPS Standard Positioning Service Performance Standards, must be at least 0.99. 
 
In practice today σpr_gnd is a static value that is determined using probabilistic 
models [16,17]. Typically this σpr_gnd is artificially inflated as a means of increasing the 
position error bounds and ensuring a known integrity for the worst-case scenario.  
 
2.5.5 Integrity Risk Hypotheses 
According to the LAAS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards the 
following algorithms for the computation of the integrity protection limits will be 
implemented by the airborne navigation subsystem.  
H0:  fault-free condition 
H1: single reference receiver failure 
These algorithms assume a normally distributed fault-free error model for the 
broadcast pseudorange corrections. The standard deviation of the correction error is 
further assumed by the aircraft navigation system to be equal to the broadcast value of 
σpr_gnd for each satellite [14]. 
The protection levels VPL and LPL will be computed as follows, where VPL 
and LPL are first computed using the H0 hypothesis, and then computed using the H1 
hypothesis. The maximum of the two hypotheses will be used for comparison with the 
alert limits. 
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HPL= MAX {LPLH0, LPLH1}     Eq. 1 
VPL= MAX {VPLH0, VPLH1}    Eq. 2 
 
VPL and LPL, assuming the H0 hypothesis, shall be computed as follows: 
            √∑        
  
     
     Eq. 3 
            √∑       
  
     
       Eq. 4 
where: 
      
 
multiplier which determines the probability of fault-free 
missed detection (ffmd) given M reference receivers, 
possible values are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 
 
                          
 
projection of the vertical component and translation of 
the along track errors into the vertical for i
th
 ranging 
source 
 
     
the partial derivative of position error in the vertical 
direction with respect to pseudorange error on the i
th
 
satellite 
 
     
the partial derivative of position error in the x-direction 
with respect to pseudorange error on the i
th
 satellite 
 
            projection of the lateral component for i
th
 ranging 
source 
     the partial derivative of position error in the y-direction 
with respect to pseudorange error on the i
th
 satellite 
    glide path angle for the final approach path 
N number of ranging sources used in the position solution 
i ranging source index 
   the pseudorange error term for the i
th
 ranging source, as 
defined in equation 5 
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GSL           
Mm=2 Mm=3 Mm=4 Mm=2 Mm=3 Mm=4 
A, B, C 5.762 5.810 5.847 2.935 2.898 2.878 
D 6.8 6.9 6.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
E 6.8 6.9 6.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
F 6.8 6.9 6.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
Table 3 Vertical Missed Detection Multipliers 
 
 
 
GSL           
Mm=2 Mm=3 Mm=4 Mm=2 Mm=3 Mm=4 
A, B, C 5.762 5.810 5.847 2.935 2.898 2.878 
D 6.8 6.9 6.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
E 6.8 6.9 6.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
F 6.8 6.9 6.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 
Table 4 Lateral Missed Detection Multipliers 
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     Eq. 5 
where: 
 
         
  is the total (post correction) fault-free noise term provided by the 
LAAS ground station for satellite i (transmitted in Type I 
message) 
 
        
  computed by airborne equipment to cover the residual 
tropospheric error for satellite i 
 
       
  computed by airborne equipment to cover the residual 
ionospheric delay uncertainty for the i
th
 ranging source 
 
      
  is the standard deviation of the aircraft contribution to the 
corrected pseudorange error for the i
th
 ranging source. The total 
aircraft contribution includes the receiver contribution and a 
standard allowance for airframe multipath. 
 
 
VPL and LPL, assuming the H1 hypothesis, shall be computed as follows: 
         {    }       Eq. 6 
         {    }       Eq. 7 
The airborne system will calculate        and       for all j (1 to   {  }) as 
follows: 
 
       |∑           
 
   |      √∑       
     
  
     Eq. 8 
       |∑            
 
   |      √∑        
     
  
     Eq. 9 
 
where: 
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multiplier which determines the probability of missed 
detection (md) given that the ground subsystem has 
faulted 1 reference receivers, possible values are shown 
in Table 3 and Table 4 
 
        
 
described above for the H0 hypothesis 
 
       described above for the H0 hypothesis 
  ground subsystem reference receiver index 
     
The B value for the i
th
 satellite and j
th
 reference receiver. 
If the j
th
 receiver was not used to produce the i
th
 
differential correction, then the ground subsystem will 
not provide a value for    . In this case, the airborne 
subsystem sets     to zero in the equations below. 
 
Mi 
the number of reference receivers used to compute the 
pseudorange corrections for the i
th
 ranging source 
(indicated by the B values) 
 
     the pseudorange error term for the i
th
 ranging source, as 
defined in equation 10. 
 
Ui 
the number of reference receivers used to compute the 
pseudorange corrections for the i
th
 ranging source, 
excluding the j
th
 reference receiver 
 
 
    
  
             
 
  
           
         
          
    Eq. 10 
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Chapter 3 System Architecture 
3.1 Open-Loop LAAS Architecture Overview 
The block diagram in Figure 8 depicts the current architecture of the University 
of Oklahoma LAAS research facility that will be used to conduct this research. The OU 
LAAS research facility includes the GNSS constellation, 4 widely spaced ground-based 
reference stations, LAAS Base Station, VDB Transmitter, and an airborne unit.  
This architecture is based on the open loop stochastic approach used by current 
certified Local Area Augmentation Systems, such as the Honeywell SmartPath SLS 
4000, that have been implemented to follow the requirements of FFA specification 
document (FAA-2937A) [8]. This document establishes the minimum performance 
requirements for a non-Federal Category I LAAS Ground Facility (LGF). 
 
Figure 8 OU LAAS Architecture 
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3.1.1 Reference Station 
Each reference station consists of the following components: 
1.) An OU designed multipath-limiting antenna (see Figure 9) 
2.) Two GPS receivers (see Figure 10) 
3.) Two wireless spread spectrum radios (see Figure 11) 
 
 
Figure 9 LAAS Reference Station with Multipath-Limiting Antenna 
 
Each reference station is built with redundant GPS receiver and spread spectrum radio 
pairs, with one spread spectrum radio broadcasting at 900 MHz to the base station and 
the other broadcasting at 2.4 GHz.  
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Figure 10 Thales Navigation GG12 OEM GPS Receiver 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Freewave OEM Spread Spectrum Radio (900MHz or 2.4 GHz) 
 
The function of the reference station is to collect pseudorange data from the 
GPS constellation and transmit the data to the LAAS ground station for use in 
calculating pseudorange corrections. Each reference station receives GPS messages 
from the GPS constellation. These signals include both ranging signals and navigation 
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messages (ephemeris, almanac, constellation health, etc.). Each reference station will 
transmit calculated pseudoranges and the additional navigation messages back to the 
LAAS ground station via a spread spectrum radio. Figure 12 illustrates the wide 
placement of the reference stations at the University of Oklahoma LAAS research 
facility and the local monitor described in section 3.2.1. 
 
 
Figure 12 OU Reference Station Placement 
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3.1.2 Base Station 
 The OU LAAS Base station consists of the following 
1.) Eight Freewave spread spectrum radios  
2.) One central processing computer 
a. Window7 OS 
b. Quad core AMD Phenom II X4 @ 3.7 GHz 
c. 8GB RAM  
d. Two 8 port SeaLevel PCI-bus Serial Cards 
3.) LAAS base station software (implemented in LabVIEW) 
 
The LAAS base station (LBS) receives pseudorange information and navigation 
information (ephemeris, almanac, constellation health, etc.) from the reference stations 
and calculates the corresponding pseudorange corrections.  The LBS then formats the 
pseudorange corrections and corresponding integrity information according to the 
"Augmentation System (LAAS) Signal-in-Space Interface Control Document” into the 
TYPE 1 LAAS Message. The LBS also constructs a TYPE 2 LAAS message. The 
TYPE 2 LAAS Message identifies the exact location for which the differential 
corrections provided by the LBS are referenced. The message also contains 
configuration data and data to compute a tropospheric correction [21]. Finally the LBS 
constructs a TYPE 4 message. The TYPE 4 message contains one or more data sets that 
each contain final approach data and associated vertical and lateral alert limits. 
The ground station then transmits these messages to the airplane via a VHF data 
broadcast (VDB) transmitter.  
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3.1.3 VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) 
The test system utilizes the following components for the VHF data broadcast. 
1.) VDB transmitter (see Figure 13) 
a. Frequency range: 108.025 – 117.950MHz. 
b. Rated power: 10W to 80W  
2.) 24v dc power supply 
3.) VHF broadcast antenna 
4.) GPS 1 PPS (used for constructing 500ms frames of the TDMA broadcast 
transmitted by the VDB) 
 
 
Figure 13 Telerad (EM9009 A) VDB Transmitter 
 
The LAAS Message will be sent to the VBD Transmitter from the LAAS base station 
via an RS-485 point-to-point asynchronous interface. The data packets from the LAAS 
base station will be formatted as shown in Table 5 [22].   
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Section Size (bytes) Description 
Packet Sync 2 0x00FF(0x00FF followed by 0x0000) 
Message ID 1 0x5C (see Table 6) 
Message Length 1 
Number of bytes in the application data 
section 
Application data 
(optional) 
0-255 
Each byte can be any 8-bit value 
( One LAAS Message: Type 1, 2, or 4) 
Checksum 2 16 bit additive checksum (LSB) first 
Table 5 VDB Data Message Format 
 
Message 
ID 
Message Description Size (bytes) Application Data Format 
0x5C CAT-I Message 255x Byte1- Reserved (set to 0x00) 
Byte2-Reserved( set to 0xFF) 
Byte3- TDMA Slot # (0-15) 
Bytes (4-255) LAAS Message 
(Type 1, 2, or 4) 
Table 6 VDB Application Data Format 
 
Each message that is received from the LAAS base station will be evaluated to 
determine if the VBD can transmit the message within the requested TDMA time slot 
and then either be discarded or transmitted at the configured frequency and power. A 
full explanation of the TDMA time slot evaluation can be found in [22]. The University 
of Oklahoma LAAS research facility transmits all LAAS message at a frequency of 
113.55MHz and a power rating of 40 watts with an Effective Radiated Power of 120 
watts.  
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3.1.4 Airborne Unit 
The Airborne Unit receives the standard GPS signal, along with the LAAS 
information from the ground station, and combines them to provide precision position 
information to guide the plane along the approach path. 
 The Airborne Unit is composed of the following: a Control Unit, a 
Rockwell Collins GNLU 930 Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR), a Course Deviation 
Indicator (CDI) and two antennas.   One antenna receives the GPS signal from the GPS 
constellation.  The second antenna utilized is a standard VHF navigational antenna, 
which receives the LAAS signal that is transmitted by the VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) 
from the ground station.  The functional layout of the airborne navigation system is 
illustrated in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14 LAAS Airborne Unit 
 
The Control Unit allows the pilot to select the frequency that is being utilized by 
the VDB to transmit the LAAS messages for the desired airport. Additionally the pilot 
can select which Final approach segment the MMR should use to provide guidance 
information. This information is found on the LAAS approach plate for the airport. 
 The Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR), shown in Figure 15, is designed to receive 
several different navigational signals, such as the GPS, LAAS, ILS, VOR, DME, and 
localizer.   In the LAAS application, the MMR receives the standard GPS signal and the 
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LAAS VHF Data Broadcast (VDB). The MMR uses the pseudorange corrections, from 
the TYPE 1 LAAS message transmitted by the LAAS base station, to augment the GPS 
signal and provide a more accurate position calculation.     
 
Figure 15 Rockwell Collins (GNLU-930) Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR) 
 
 The MMR also retrieves which final approach information will be used 
from the LAAS Type 4 message transmitted by the LAAS base station.  The MMR 
compares this final approach information with the calculated position of the aircraft and 
determines how to navigate the plane onto the final approach path.  The MMR relays 
this horizontal and vertical guidance information to the pilot through the airplane’s 
navigation instruments, such as the Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) seen in Figure 16.   
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Figure 16 Course Deviation Indicator (CDI) 
 
3.2 Closed-Loop Architecture 
The block diagram in Figure 17 outlines the architecture of the new and novel 
real-time closed-loop LAAS system that was constructed to perform this research.  This 
closed-loop system, unlike current LAAS implementations, utilizes a Local Monitor 
(LM) to calculate system error in real-time by validating ranging corrections that will be 
transmitted to airborne users. Utilizing the calculated system error an adaptive integrity 
monitor dynamically changes the broadcast integrity parameter σpr_gnd . 
 
Figure 17 Closed-Loop Architecture 
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3.2.1 Local Monitor 
The Local Monitor is composed of the following: a GPS antenna, a GPS 
receiver previously shown in Figure 10, and a Software Navigator. A block diagram of 
this architecture can be seen in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18 LAAS Local Monitor 
 
The Local Monitor is a software based LAAS navigator whose actual position is 
at a known (surveyed) location. The LM calculates its position using a least squares 
single point solution as described in section 3.2.2 following. The LM uses the calculated 
position and the pseudorange corrections that are intended for transmission to the 
airborne unit to calculate its LAAS corrected position. The LAAS corrected position 
can then be compared to the known (surveyed) position of the LM. The difference in the 
two positions is representative of the actual accumulated error and is a real-time 
representation of the total LAAS ground station error. This error can now be used to 
deterministically modify the integrity broadcast parameters, specifically σpr_gnd, that will 
be transmitted to the airborne unit. 
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3.2.2 Local Monitor Position Calculation 
According to the LAAS Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards the 
following algorithms for the computation of position will be implemented by the 
airborne navigation subsystem. 
            Eq. 11 
where: 
   N dimensional vector containing the differentially corrected pseudorange 
measurements minus the expected ranging values based on the location of 
the satellites and the location of the user (x) 
Where N is the number of satellites 
 
   true four dimensional position/clock vector  
[ground-track (x-axis), cross-track (y-axis), up (z-axis), (in a standard right-
handed coordinate system) and clock] relative to the position/clock vector x for 
which the linearization has been made; 
 
  Geometry matrix consisting of N rows of line of sight vectors from each 
satellite to x, augmented by a “1” for the clock. 
 
   [                                     ] = i
th
 row of G 
  is an N dimensional vector containing the errors in y; 
 
The weighted least squares estimate (  ̂) of the states can be found by: 
  ̂          Eq. 12 
where: 
  (      )            Eq. 13 
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where: 
  
  represents the total error as described in equation 5  
 
As can be seen in equation 14 the weighting matrix    is composed of σpr_gnd 
from the LBS and other error parameters (σiono, σtropo, and σair) calculated in the airborne 
unit [24]. These parameters that are specific to the airborne unit are set to zero, which 
leaves σpr_gnd as the remaining error parameter. If we assume an error free LAAS 
Ground Facility then we would set σpr_gnd to 0 as well; the resulting solution would then 
be a single-point least squares solution as described in equation 15 below [25]. 
 
  ̂  (   )            Eq. 15 
 
The Local Monitor implements equation 15 to calculate its position then applies the 
LAAS pseudorange corrections to calculate the final LAAS corrected position. 
 The LAAS corrected position is then compared to the known (surveyed) 
position of the LM to calculate the vertical and horizontal error.  
 
3.2.3 Adaptive Integrity Monitor 
 The Adaptive Integrity Monitor is a new software based monitor that 
utilizes the calculated LAAS system error, specifically the vertical error, from the Local 
Monitor to deterministically set the values of σpr_gnd that are broadcast via the VDB.  
The Adaptive Integrity Monitor reads the calculated vertical error from the 
Local Monitor and applies a smoothing filter, shown in equation 16, to generate a 
smoothed vertical error (VEsm).  
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     [ ]   
 
 
∑   [   ]           Eq. 16 
where: 
VEsm The average vertical error over N samples. 
 
N The number of Vertical Error samples in the average. 
 
VE The instantaneous vertical error calculated by the Local Monitor 
(section 3.2.2) 
 
A threshold algorithm is then applied to the smoothed vertical error (VEsm) to 
deterministically set σpr_gnd. The threshold algorithm compares VEsm to a range from 0 to 
10m and sets the value of σpr_gnd according to the Table 7 following. All VEsm values 
greater than 10 meters will be set to the .6. The range of σpr_gnd that is used in the 
threshold algorithm was determined via the sensitivity analysis explained in Chapter 4.   
 
VEsm  σpr_gnd 
< 2m .1 
< 3m .2 
< 4m .25 
< 5m .3 
< 6m .35 
< 7m .4 
< 8m .45 
< 9m .5 
< 10m .55 
>10m .6 
Table 7 Threshold values 
 
A flow chart of the Adaptive Integrity Monitor algorithm can be seen in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Adaptive Integrity Monitor Algorithm 
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Chapter 4 Experimental Results 
4.1 Experimental Objective 
All experiments described in this section were conducted utilizing the University 
of Oklahoma LAAS research facility described in Chapter 3.  
One of the  goals of this research is to determine the sensitivity of the LAAS 
airborne navigation solution to σpr_gnd. Based on the results of the sensitivity analysis 
described in this chapter,  a  closed loop adaptive integrity monitor was designed 
capable of deterministically assigning a value to σpr_gnd without reducing accuracy or 
overall system availability.  
 Sensitivity of σpr_gnd is determined with respect to availability of the LAAS 
system while monitoring Navigation System Error (NSE) to ensure system accuracy is 
not compromised. 
 Navigational System Error (NSE) is the difference in receiver-calculated 
position and the true position of the receiver. NSE can be divided into two components: 
Vertical Error (VE) and Horizontal Error (HE). The component of greatest concern is 
VE since it both contributes the most to NSE and, more importantly, it poses the largest 
threat to the user during precision approach and landing.  
NSE exists in the position domain, and is typically reported from navigation 
devices in the form of Latitude, Longitude and Altitude. It is trivial to calculate the 
Vertical Component of NSE as can be seen in equation 17.  
                         Eq. 17 
To calculate the Horizontal Component of NSE a coordinate system conversion is 
required to allow HE to be reported in a more intuitive unit, meters, as opposed to 
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degrees, minutes, and seconds provided by the angular coordinates (latitude, longitude, 
altitude). The conversion from geodetic angular coordinates to geodetic Cartesian 
coordinates (X, Y, and Z) centered at the earth’s center, is called Earth Centered Earth 
Fixed (ECEF) coordinates, is described in Appendix A.  
  Availability is defined as the ability of the navigation system to provide the 
required function and performance at the initiation of the intended operation. In the 
experiments and results described in this section availability is considered as the ability 
of the airborne navigator to provide a differentially corrected position solution. Two 
different methods were utilized to measure availability in this research and are 
described in following section. 
4.2 Experimental Configuration  
4.2.1 Dynamic Sensitivity Test 
A dynamic sensitivity test was implemented to determine the sensitivity of the LAAS 
system availability as it is related to σpr_gnd. One primary goal of this test was to 
determine what value of σpr_gnd over-bound the Vertical and Horizontal Protection limits 
to the point that the system becomes unavailable.  
 For the purpose of this test, availability is determined by monitoring the state of 
the CDI glide slope flag on the airborne navigator. If the glide slope flag is displayed as 
seen in Figure 20 then the system is considered unavailable for the purpose of this test 
and for the purpose of CAT I or CAT II landing. If the glide slope flag is concealed, as 
seen in Figure 21, the system is considered available for approach and landing. 
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Figure 20 Navigation Unavailable 
 
 
Figure 21 Navigation Available 
 
Glide Slope Flag 
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The dynamic test utilized the following components: 
1.) Four Reference Stations described in section 3.1.1 
2.) LAAS base station described in section 3.1.2 
3.) VHF Data Broadcast transmitter described in section 3.1.3 
4.) Multi-Mode Receiver and Course Deviation Indicator  described in section 
3.1.4 
5.) National Instruments myDAQ® data acquisition device 
6.) Custom software test harness developed in LabVIEW® described below 
 
A logical diagram of the test system can be seen in Figure 22.  
 
 
Figure 22 Dynamic Sensitivity Diagram 
 
A flow chart describing the algorithm used to perform the sensitivity test can be seen in 
Figure 23. 
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Figure 23 Dynamic Sensitivity Flowchart 
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During each iteration of the test, data was logged to the local hard drive. The 
logged data included a UTC timestamp, the broadcast value of σpr_gnd , CDI Glideslope 
Flag voltage, CDI vertical needle voltage, the LAAS corrected position, Vertical Error, 
Horizontal Error. Data was collected for 12 hours to match the approximate time it 
takes a single GPS satellite to orbit the earth. The 12 hour duration guarantees all 
satellites were in view at least one time during the course of the test. The results of this 
sensitivity test are shown in Figure 24 following. The stair-step pattern displayed in 
Figure 24 is a result of the incremental changes of σpr_gnd until the system becomes 
unavailble as outlined in the flowchart in Figure 23 previously. When the value of 
σpr_gnd makes a change from a larger value to .2 this is an indication the system has 
become unavailable, as shown in Figure 25. The data illustrates that the system is rarely 
available once the value of σpr_gnd exceeds a value of .6. 
 Figure 26 following illustrates the percentage of time a given value of σpr_gnd 
was broadcast during the 12 hour period of time the test was conducted. This figure 
further indicates that a significant loss of availabilty occurred once the value of .6 σpr_gnd 
was broadcast. Based on the analysis of this test .6 σpr_gnd was selected as the maximum 
value of σpr_gnd that will be broadcast from the test system. 
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Figure 24 Dynamic σpr_gnd Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Figure 25 Loss of Availability 
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Figure 26 Availability shown as Percent σpr_gnd 
 
4.2.2 Multi-Orbit Static Sensitivity Test 
Utilizing the results of the dynamic sensitivity test, described in section 4.2.1, a 
set of multi-orbit static sensitivity tests were executed. The goal of these tests was to 
quantify the availability of the system at a specified σpr_gnd ,verify that the Navigation 
System Error stayed within acceptable bounds, and establish a baseline vertical error for 
static values of σpr_gnd that could be used for analysis of the new adaptive integrity 
monitor. 
For the purpose of these tests, availability was determined by reading the 
differential mode indicator, present in ARINC label 273. ARINC label 273 is output on 
the ARINC 429 bus from the Airborne Unit’s Multi-Mode Receiver. To retrieve the 
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differential mode indicator a custom logger was constructed. This ARINC logger is 
described in detail in section 4.3.1. 
This test utilized the following components: 
1) Four Reference Stations described in section 3.1.1 
2) LAAS base station described in section 3.1.2 
3) VHF Data Broadcast transmitter described in section 3.1.3 
4) Multi-Mode Receiver section 3.1.4 
5) A data logging computer  
a. Condor® CEI-715 PCMCIA card, shown in Appendix F 
b. Custom ARINC data logging software developed in C++  
The sensitivity test was conducted as follows: 
1.) Set a static value for σpr_gnd  
2.) Start LAAS base station software 
3.) Wait for LAAS base station to start calculating differential corrections 
4.) Start VDB Transmitter 
5.) Start ARINC data logger to collect MMR ARINC messages 
6.) Collect ARINC messages from MMR for a minimum of 24 hours 
This process was repeated for the following values of σpr_gnd (.1, .2, .4, and .6).  Each test 
was run for a minimum of 24 hours to ensure two complete orbits of each GPS satellite. 
The data logging software generated two types of log files for each test.  
One log file contains all ARINC labels in their raw format as output from the 
MMR. The second log file includes a subset of the ARINC messages that have been 
decoded and will be used for post processing. The decoded ARINC messages include 
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the following data UTC Timestamp, latitude, longitude, altitude, and navigation mode. 
The information collected in the decoded log file was used in post processing to 
calculate availability and Navigation System Error (NSE) for each static value of σpr_gnd. 
The results of these tests are discussed in section 4.4 following. 
 
4.2.3 Real-Time Adaptive Integrity Monitor 
Applying the σpr_gnd range determined from the sensitivity analysis, and utilizing 
the real-time vertical error calculated by the local monitor, the adaptive integrity 
monitor algorithm described in Figure 19 was implemented in LabVIEW® and tested. 
The goal of the test was to demonstrate that σpr_gnd could be deterministically modified 
in real-time without negatively impacting availability or accuracy of the system. 
This test utilized the following components: 
1) Four Reference Stations described in section 3.1.1 
2) LAAS base station described in section 3.1.2 
3) Local Monitor described in section 3.2.1 
4) Adaptive Integrity Monitor implemented in  LabVIEW®  
5) VHF Data Broadcast transmitter described in section 3.1.3 
6) Multi-Mode Receiver section 3.1.4 
7) A data logging computer  
a. Condor® CEI-715 PCMCIA card, shown in Appendix F 
b. Custom ARINC data logging software developed in C++  
 
The experimental protocol proceeded as follows: 
55 
1.) Start LAAS base station software 
a. Local Monitor is started by base station 
2.) Enable Adaptive Integrity Monitor  
3.) Wait for LAAS base station to start calculating differential corrections 
4.) Start VDB Transmitter 
5.) Start ARINC data logger to collect MMR ARINC messages 
6.) Collect ARINC messages from MMR for a minimum of 24 hours 
The MMR’s calculated user position and current navigation mode was collected using 
the custom ARINC data logger as described in the multi-orbit static sensitivity test 
described in section 4.2.2. This data was used in post processing to generate availability 
and Navigation System Error metrics that were used to validate the effectiveness of the 
new real-time closed-loop adaptive integrity monitor. These results are discussed in 
section 4.4. 
4.3 Data Collection and Processing 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
The data used to build the algorithms and evaluate the performance of the adaptive 
integrity monitor were collected from three different sources: 
1.) LAAS Base Station 
2.) Multi-Mode Receiver 
3.) Course Deviation Indicator 
Figure 27 following illustrates all of these data collection points. 
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Figure 27 Data logging diagram 
 
The data collected from the base station includes the vertical and horizontal 
navigation system error calculated by the local monitor, the σpr_gnd values that are 
broadcast from the base station, and a UTC time stamp. This data was collected at a rate 
of 2 Hz and written to a log file on the local hard drive of the base station computer. 
The data collected from the Multi-Mode Receiver that was used for the experiments 
described above include the LAAS corrected user position calculated by the Multi-
Mode Receiver, the navigation mode flag, and a UTC timestamp. This information was 
collected by custom data logging software written in C++ that interfaced to a Condor 
CEI-715 ARINC card to read and decode the desired ARINC labels output by the MMR 
on the MMR’s ARINC 429 bus. The custom data logging software was written to 
generate two log files. One log file contains all of the raw ARINC labels transmitted by 
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the MMR. The second log file contains only a subset of the ARINC labels transmitted 
by the MMR, which are needed for the experiments described above. The ARINC 
labels listed in Table 8, following, are the labels that were used for the experiments 
described above. The labels were decoded by the data logger and written to the local 
hard drive of the data logging computer. All labels were decoded using the 
specifications outlined in Rockwell Collins Interface Control Document for the MMR 
GNLU 930[26]. The detailed label definitions used for decoding the ARINC labels 
listed in Table 8, below, can be found in Appendix C. 
 
ARINC Label Description 
110 Latitude 
111 Longitude  
120 Latitude Fine  
121 Longitude Fine 
140 UTC Fine 
150 UTC 
273 GPS Sensor Op Mode (includes navigation mode indicator) 
370 WGS Height in feet 
Table 8 MMR ARINC Labels 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
The data collected from the Course Deviation Indicator included the voltages for the 
Glide Slope Flag and the Vertical Needle. A custom data logger was developed using 
LabVIEW®, to interface to a National Instruments myDAQ® to read the voltages, 
perform the analog to digital conversion, and log the voltages and state of the CDI to a 
file on the local hard drive of the data logging computer. The voltages collected were 
used to determine if the CDI was in differential navigation mode based on the state of 
the glide slope flag. If the glideslope flag was displayed, as shown in Figure 20, then the 
glideslope was considered unavailable, and the data logger application logged the state 
of the CDI as unavailable, otherwise the state was logged as available. Table 9, below, 
shows the voltage ranges of both the glide slope flag and the vertical needle.  
A wiring diagram of the CDI used to design this data acquisition system can be 
found in Appendix D. 
 
 Voltage Range Description 
Glide Slope Flag 0v to .7v .7v flag is concealed (glideslope available) 
0v flag is displayed (glideslope unavailable) 
Vertical Needle -1.5v to 1.5v 0v vertical needle is centered 
-1.5v vertical needle is (fully deflected upwards 
indicating unavailable) 
Table 9 CDI Voltage Ranges 
 
 
4.3.2 Data Processing 
For the Multi-Orbit Sensitivity tests and the performance evaluation of the 
Adaptive Integrity Monitor a minimum of 24 hours of data was collected and then post-
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processed to calculate vertical error, standard deviation of vertical error, and system 
availability.  
To calculate these metrics a post-processing application was written in C#. The 
post-processing application combined multiple log files that were generated for a single 
test, down-sampled the data to 1Hz, and performed the necessary calculations to 
generate vertical error and determine if the MMR was in differential navigation mode.  
The vertical error was determined using known altitude of the MMR and the calculated 
user position output by the MMR (see equation 17). The new down-sampled data was 
then written to a new comma separated value (.csv) file. A screen shot and main 
processing method of the post-processing application can be seen in Appendix E. 
Finally, Microsoft Excel was used to generate vertical error graphs, calculate the 
standard deviation of the vertical error, and calculate the % availability of the system 
based on the amount of time the MMR was in differential navigation mode. To 
calculate % availability the following equation was used: 
 
            
(   )
 
          Eq. 18 
 
where: 
 
  Duration of test in seconds 
 
  Total # of seconds the MMR was not in differential navigation mode 
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4.4 Experimental Results 
4.4.1 Multi-Orbit Static Sensitivity 
The analysis of the test data collected for the multi-orbit sensitivity test described in 
section 4.2.2, validated that as σpr_gnd increased, availability of the system decreased as a 
result of the over-bounding of the vertical and horizontal protection levels induced by 
inflated values of σpr_gnd.  
The following four figures represent the vertical error for each of the multi-orbit 
sensitivity tests that were performed. The data in these figures show that less than a 
meter of vertical error can be maintained provided the system is not over-bound, 
causing loss of system availability. Furthermore, it demonstrates that a value of .6 for 
σpr_gnd is sufficiently large to over-bound the system and cause a degradation in position 
accuracy due to the loss of availability, as was initially indicated in the dynamic 
sensitivity test previously described in section 4.2.1. Table 10, following, shows the 
availability of the system associated with each Multi-Orbit test that was performed.  
 
 
 
61 
 
 
Figure 28 Vertical Error for Multi-Orbit Sensitivity Test with σpr_gnd = 0.1 
 
 
Figure 29 Vertical Error for Multi-Orbit Sensitivity Test with σpr_gnd = 0.2 
 
62 
 
 
Figure 30 Vertical Error for Multi-Orbit Sensitivity Test with σpr_gnd = 0.4 
 
 
 
Figure 31 Vertical Error for Multi-Orbit Sensitivity Test with σpr_gnd = 0.6 
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Duration (h) σpr_gnd % Availability |  | ( ) 
24 .1 99.76 .1336 
24 .2 99.52 .1188 
24 .4 93.95 .1203 
24 .6 32.69 .8707 
Table 10 Multi-Orbit Availability with static σpr_gnd 
 
4.4.2 Real-Time Adaptive Integrity Monitor 
The final design of the Adaptive Integrity Monitor described in section 4.2.3 includes a 
smoothing filter designed to reduce large variations in vertical error over short time 
periods that would result in large changes of σpr_gnd in a short period time. This design is 
a result of initial testing that was performed without a smoothing filter. The vertical 
error of this test is shown in Figure 32 following. The vertical error is clearly within the 
2.9m acceptable vertical accuracy requirement for GBAS Service Level F which is 
required for CAT IIIb precision approach. However, the recorded system availability of 
98.64% was less than desirable, as shown in Table 11 following.  
It was hypothesized that the Airborne Navigation position algorithms of the 
MMR were not designed to account for rapid changes in σpr_gnd . This was based on the 
performance metrics collected from the static sensitivity tests indicating that higher 
level of availability was achievable with this test system.  
In an effort to validate this theory a smoothing filter was added to the Adaptive 
Integrity Monitor and the tests were executed again.  
 The results of this second test, that included a 120 point smoothing filter, 
validated the hypotheses. Figure 33, following, demonstrates the vertical error of this 
test remained within the acceptable limits for GBAS Service Level F. Additionally, the 
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results of this second test  demonstrated a system availability improvement to 99.91%, 
as shown in Table 11 following. 
 
 
Figure 32 Adaptive σpr_gnd Instantaneous 
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Figure 33 Adaptive σpr_gnd with a Smoothing Filter 
 
 
4.5 Results Summary 
Sensitivity analysis was performed over a range of σpr_gnd values to characterize 
accuracy and availability. The results of this sensitivity analysis were used to design the 
new Adaptive Integrity Monitor and verify the theoretical advantages.  
The data in Table 11 supports the theoretical advantages of the Adaptive Integrity 
Monitor over the current practice of probabilistic determination and over-bounding of 
σpr_gnd. Using the closed loop Adaptive Integrity Monitor the broadcast parameter 
σpr_gnd can be dynamically changed avoiding over-bounding of the system and therefore 
increasing system availability without degradation in accuracy. 
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Duration(h) σpr_gnd % Availability |  | ( ) σVE ( ) 
24 .1 99.76 .1336 .1560 
24 .2 99.52 .1188 .1272 
24 .4 93.95 .1203 .1001 
24 .6 32.69 .8707 .1569 
24 Variable-
Instantaneous 
98.64 .1153 .1799 
24 Variable-
Smoothed 
99.91 .0563 .0485 
 
Table 11 Test Results Summary 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Research 
The research described in this dissertation presents a new and novel set of 
algorithms and architecture for a real-time adaptive integrity monitor that utilizes 
navigation system vertical error to deterministically set the broadcast integrity 
parameter σpr_gnd.  
This deterministic evaluation of σpr_gnd as a function of navigation system 
vertical error eliminates the need for probabilistic over-bounding of. σpr_gnd. By 
eliminating the need to over-bound integrity parameters an increase of system integrity 
was achieved. A subsequent result of increasing integrity was an increase in system 
availability.  
The data collected in this research validated that the new closed loop integrity 
monitor is capable of improving system availability to 99.9%. This level of availability 
can assist LAAS in meeting its final goal of providing differential navigation suitable 
for Category II and Category III instrument landings. 
Additionally, the research described in the dissertation outlines a new method 
for real-time analysis of airborne navigation algorithm sensitivity to σpr_gnd. This 
sensitivity analysis was fundamental to the design and performance evaluation of the 
new adaptive integrity monitor. 
Finally this dissertation presented a complete and functional real-time 
implementation of a Local Area Augmentation System that utilizes closed-loop 
feedback to improve integrity and availability.  
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5.1 Recommendations for Future Research 
If LAAS is to meet its final goal of providing differential navigation suitable for 
Category II and Category III instrument landings additional improvements in integrity 
and availability will be required. The research described in this dissertation provides a 
set of algorithms and concepts that provide a foundation that can be expanded on to 
realize this goal.  
The expansion of these concepts might include flight tests to further evaluate the 
improvements in integrity and availability due to the new adaptive integrity monitor. 
Future work should also include a sensitivity analysis of the system availability 
related to the sample size of the smoothing algorithm in the new adaptive integrity 
monitor. The goal of this analysis would be to determine the ideal sample size for the 
smoothing algorithm that would achieve the greatest availability improvement. 
The sensitivity research could also include testing the adaptive integrity monitor 
with a variety of different airborne navigation units to investigate any dependencies 
between measured performance improvements and the airborne navigator utilized for 
this research. 
5.2 Summary 
The real-time adaptive integrity monitor using closed loop feedback that was 
presented in this dissertation is a unique method for deterministically assessing the error 
of the LAAS ground subsystem, in contrast to the current probabilistic models used 
today. The research demonstrates that the adaptive integrity monitor can provide 
performance improvements in integrity and availability of the LAAS Signal-In-Space. 
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Appendix A: Conversion from LLA to ECEF 
The conversion from Latitude, Longitude, and Altitude (LLA) to Earth Centered Earth 
Fixed (ECEF) in meters can be performed using the following equations. 
 
  (   )          
  (   )          
  (
  
  
   )      
 
where 
 
 
Figure A1 ECEF and Reference Ellipsoid 
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is the ellipsoidal flattening parameter defined by WGS84 
 
   
 
             
 
 
  is the referred to as the eccentricity of the earth and can be thought of as a 
measure of how much the earth deviates from being a circle 
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Appendix B: MMR ARINC Data Logger 
 
The ARINC data logger application is a command line application written in C++ with 
no user interface. Its function is to interface to Condor CEI-715 ARINC card. It reads, 
decodes, and logs the ARINC labels output by the MMR. The following figure is the 
primary method used to decode and log the ARINC labels. 
 
void Logger::GetARINCLabels() 
{ 
    short board = m_board; 
    struct GNSS current; 
    ARINC GNSS_word = 0; 
    ARINC label; 
    unsigned long lat = 0; 
    unsigned long lon =0; 
    int error_count = 1; 
    int data_count = 0; 
    
    //initialize GNSS struct to zero 
    current = initGNSS(); 
 
    CString trace; 
     
    trace = 
"HEADER,UTC,Lat,Lon,Alt(m),HDOP,VDOP,HIL(m),VIL(m),SV_Visible,SV_Tracked,op_m
ode,ex_op_mode"; 
    //write the header to the log file 
    LogFile.Trace(trace); 
 
    while (TRUE) 
    { 
        if (check_for_quit() == TRUE) 
            break; 
 
        GNSS_word = get_ARINC_data(board,0); 
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if (GNSS_word == -1) 
        { 
            error_count ++; 
            printf("error count: %d      data count: 
%d\n",error_count, data_count); 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            data_count ++; 
 
            SaveLabel(GNSS_word); 
             
            //determine which label we have and decode it 
            switch ((short)(label_mask & GNSS_word)) 
            { 
                case label_110: //latitude measurement 
                    current.lat.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.lat.data = 
(double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 8) * 180 * 
pow(2.0,-20); 
                    current.lat.ssm  = (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.lat.label = label_110; 
                    if ((sign_mask & GNSS_word) != 0) 
                    { 
                        current.lat.data = current.lat.data -180;                
                    } 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
                case label_111: //longitude measurement 
                    current.lon.raw = GNSS_word; 
  current.lon.data = (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 8) 
  * 180 * pow(2.0,-20); 
                    current.lon.ssm  = (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.lon.label = label_111; 
                    if ((sign_mask & GNSS_word) != 0) 
                    { 
                        current.lon.data = current.lon.data -180; 
                    } 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
                case label_120: //latitude fine measurement 
                    current.lat_fine.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.lat_fine.data =  
 (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word)  >> 17) * 0.000172 
 * pow(2.0,-11); 
                    current.lat_fine.ssm  =  
(short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word)   >> 29); 
                    current.lat_fine.label = label_120; 
                    if ((sign_mask & GNSS_word) != 0) 
                    { 
                        current.lat_fine.data = 
current.lat_fine.data - 0.000172 * pow(2.0,-1); 
                    } 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
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   case label_121: //longitude fine measurement 
                    current.lon_fine.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.lon_fine.data =  
 (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 17) * 0.000172  
 * pow(2.0,-11); 
                    current.lon_fine.ssm  =  
 (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.lon_fine.label = label_120; 
 
                    if ((sign_mask & GNSS_word) != 0) 
                    { 
                        current.lon_fine.data = 
 current.lon_fine.data - 0.000172 * pow(2.0,-1); 
                    } 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
                case label_370: //WGS-84 height, feet 
                    current.wgs_height.raw= GNSS_word; 
                    current.wgs_height.data =  
 (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 8) *  0.125; 
                    current.wgs_height.ssm  =  
(short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.wgs_height.label = label_370; 
 
                    if ((sign_mask & GNSS_word) != 0) 
                    { 
                        current.wgs_height.data = 
current.wgs_height.data - 131072; 
                    } 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
                case label_140: //UTC time fine measurement 
                    current.UTC_time_fine.raw= GNSS_word; 
                    current.UTC_time_fine.data =  
 (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 8) *  pow(2.0,-20); 
                    current.UTC_time_fine.ssm  =  
 (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.UTC_time_fine.label = label_140; 
 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
            case label_150: //UTC time 
                    current.UTC_time.raw= GNSS_word; 
                    current.UTC_time.hours   =  
  (short)((hour_mask & GNSS_word) >> 23); 
                    current.UTC_time.minutes =  
  (short)((minute_mask & GNSS_word) >> 17); 
                    current.UTC_time.seconds = 
  (short)((second_mask & GNSS_word) >> 11);            
                    current.UTC_time.ssm  =  
  (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.UTC_time.label = label_150; 
 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
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      case label_101: //HDOP 
                    current.HDOP.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.HDOP.data =  
 (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 13) 
  * 1024 * pow(2.0,-15); 
                    current.HDOP.ssm  =  
 (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.HDOP.label = label_101; 
 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
            case label_102: //VDOP 
                    current.VDOP.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.VDOP.data =  
  (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 13)  
  * 1024 * pow(2.0,-15); 
                    current.VDOP.ssm  =  
 (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.VDOP.label = label_102; 
 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
            case label_130: //Horizontal Integrity Limit is in Nautical Miles 
                    current.HIL.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.HIL.data =  
  (double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 11)  
  * 16 * pow(2.0,-17); 
                    current.HIL.ssm = (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.HIL.label = label_130; 
 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
            case label_133: //Vertical Integrity Limit is in Feet 
                    current.VIL.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.VIL.data =  
  double)((data_mask & GNSS_word) >> 10) 
  * 32768 * pow(2.0,-18); 
                    current.VIL.ssm = (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.VIL.label = label_133; 
 
                    current.valid = TRUE; 
                    break; 
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      case label_273: 
                    current.status.raw = GNSS_word; 
                    current.status.op_mode =  
  (short)((op_mode_mask & GNSS_word) >> 25) ; 
                    current.status.ex_op_mode =  
  (short)((ex_op_mode_mask & GNSS_word) >> 23); 
                    current.status.sv_tracked = 
  (short)((sv_tracked_mask & GNSS_word) >> 19) ; 
                    current.status.sv_visible  = 
  (short)((sv_visible_mask & GNSS_word) >> 15) ; 
                    current.status.ssm  =  
 (short)((ssm_mask & GNSS_word) >> 29); 
                    current.status.label = label_273;                                    
                break; 
                default: 
                    current.valid = 0; 
                break; 
            } 
             
            if (current.valid == TRUE)  //good data from MMR 
            { 
                 
                //build trace message 
                
trace.Format("POSITION,%d:%d:%d,%lf,%lf,%lf,%lf,%lf,%lf,%lf
,%d,%d,%d,%d" 
                                ,current.UTC_time.hours 
                                ,current.UTC_time.minutes 
                                ,current.UTC_time.seconds 
                                ,current.lat.data+current.lat_fine.data 
                                ,current.lon.data+current.lon_fine.data 
                                ,FeetToMeters(current.wgs_height.data) 
  // convert feet to meters 
                                ,current.HDOP.data 
                                ,current.VDOP.data 
                                ,NMToMeters(current.HIL.data)  
 //convert Nautical miles to meters 
                                ,FeetToMeters(current.VIL.data)  
  //convert feet to meters 
                                ,current.status.sv_visible 
                                ,current.status.sv_tracked 
                                ,current.status.op_mode 
                                ,current.status.ex_op_mode); 
 
                //Log decoded message to trace file 
                LogFile.Trace(trace);                
                 
            } 
 
        } 
    } 
} 
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Appendix C: MMR ARINC Labels 
 
Figure C1 ARINC Label 110 
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Figure C2 ARINC Label 111 
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Figure C3 ARINC Label 120 
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Figure C4 ARINC Label 121 
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Figure C5 ARINC Label 140 
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Figure C6 ARINC Label 150 
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Figure C7 ARINC Label 273 
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Figure C8 ARINC Label 370 
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Appendix D: Course Deviation Indicator Wiring Diagram 
The following wiring diagram was acquired from a Cessna Service and Parts Manual 
and was used to instrument the Course Deviation Indicator to read both the Glideslope 
flag and Vertical Pointer voltages to detect availability.
 
Figure D1 Course Deviation Indicator Wiring Diagram 
88 
Appendix E: MMR ARINC Log File Reader 
The figure below is the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of the custom ARINC 
log reader application written to read and process the log files generated by the MMR 
ARINC data logger described in Appendix B.  
 
 
Figure E1 MMR ARINC Log File Reader GUI 
 
The following C# code is the primary method used to parse, down-sample, and process 
the log files generated by the MMR ARINC data logger. 
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public void parseMMRLogFile(int sampleRateInSeconds, 
                                    ECEF referencePosition, 
                                    string inputfilePath) 
        { 
            #region variable initialization 
 
            string outputFileHeader = "MMR Time 
(UTC),LocalTime(24hr),Lat,Lon,Alt(m),HDOP,VDOP,HIL(m),VIL(m),SV_Visible,SV_Tr
acked,op_mode,ex_op_mode,DiffMode,Alt_Averaged(m),True_Altitude,VE(m), 
HE(m)"; 
            string delimStr = ","; 
            char[] delimiter = delimStr.ToCharArray(); 
 
            int maxCoastSamples = 90; 
            int coastCounter = 0; 
            int HELimit = 1; 
 
            int counter = 0; 
            string currentLine = string.Empty; 
            int lastSecond = -1; 
            double accumulatedAltitude = 0; 
            int accumulatedSamples = 0; 
            double previousHorizontalError = 0; 
            double accumulatedLatitude = 0; 
            double accumulatedLongitude = 0; 
 
            #endregion 
 
            string outputFilePath = GetOutputFilePath(inputfilePath,  
sampleRateInSeconds); 
 
            //read MMR Logfile line by line and process 
            using (System.IO.StreamReader inputFile =  
new System.IO.StreamReader(inputfilePath)) 
            { 
                using (System.IO.StreamWriter outputFile =  
new System.IO.StreamWriter(outputFilePath)) 
                { 
                    outputFile.WriteLine(outputFileHeader); 
 
                    while ((currentLine = inputFile.ReadLine()) != null) 
                    { 
                        List<string> lineParts =  
currentLine.Split(',').ToList<string>(); 
 
                        if (lineParts[0].Equals("HEADER", 
 StringComparison.InvariantCultureIgnoreCase)) 
                        { 
                            continue; 
                        } 
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//fetch the part of the line that contains the MMR time 
                        string mmrTime = lineParts[1]; 
                        //seperate the mmrTime into its parts 
                        List<string> mmrTimeParts =  
mmrTime.Split(':').ToList<string>(); 
 
                        //keep a running average of Altitude 
                        double altitude = Convert.ToDouble(lineParts[4]); 
                        accumulatedAltitude = accumulatedAltitude + altitude; 
                        accumulatedSamples++; 
                         
                        double latitudeCurrent = 
Convert.ToDouble(lineParts[2]); 
                        double longitudeCurrent =  
Convert.ToDouble(lineParts[3]); 
 
                        accumulatedLatitude = 
accumulatedLatitude + latitudeCurrent; 
                        accumulatedLongitude =  
accumulatedLongitude + longitudeCurrent; 
                         
                        //parse out the seconds so we can count sample rate.  
                        int second = Convert.ToInt32(mmrTimeParts[2]); 
 
                        //only look at a record when the second changes 
                        if (second != lastSecond) 
                        { 
                            lastSecond = second; 
 
                            //only write data out  
   //according to our sample rate                             
                            if ((counter == 0)) 
                            { 
                                string mmrDate =  
      GetMMR_UTCDateFromLocalDate(localDate, 
 localTime, mmrTime); 
 
                               int diffMode = GetDiffModeStatusFromMMR( 
 lineParts[12]); 
 
                                double averagelatitude =  
  accumulatedLatitude / accumulatedSamples; 
                                double averagelongitude =  
  accumulatedLongitude / accumulatedSamples; 
                                double averageAltitude =  
  accumulatedAltitude / accumulatedSamples;                                 
                                double averageVerticalError =  
  averageAltitude - referencePosition.Altitude; 
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double averageHorizontalError =  
GetHorizontalErrorInMeters(averagelatitude, 
averagelongitude, altitude, referencePosition); 
                  double horizontalErrorCurrent =  
GetHorizontalErrorInMeters(latitudeCurrent, 
longitudeCurrent,altitude,referencePosition); 
                               
                                if (averageHorizontalError > HELimit) 
                                { 
                                    if (coastCounter < maxCoastSamples) 
                                    { 
                                        averageHorizontalError = 
    previousHorizontalError; 
                                        coastCounter++; 
                                    } 
                                    else 
                                    { 
                                        coastCounter = 0; 
                                        previousHorizontalError =  
    averageHorizontalError; 
                                    } 
                                } 
                                else 
                                { 
                                    coastCounter = 0; 
                                } 
 
                                previousHorizontalError =  
averageHorizontalError; 
 
                                double horizontalErrorToLog = 0; 
 
                                if (horizontalErrorCurrent <  
averageHorizontalError) 
                                { 
                                    horizontalErrorToLog =  
horizontalErrorCurrent; 
                                } 
                                else 
                                { 
                                    horizontalErrorToLog =  
averageHorizontalError; 
                                } 
 
                                //fetch the remaining data that we will add 
                                string allDataToTheRigtOfMMRTime =  
currentLine.Split(delimiter, 3)[2]; 
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//format the Altitude with 6 decimal points 
                  string output =  
string.Format("{0} {1},{2} {3},{4},{5},{6},{7},{8},{9}", 
                              mmrDate,  
mmrTime, 
localDate, 
localTime,  
allDataToTheRigtOfMMRTime, 
                              diffMode.ToString(), 
        averageAltitude.ToString("F6"), 
                              referencePosition.Altitude.ToString("F6"), 
                              averageVerticalError.ToString("F6"), 
                              horizontalErrorToLog.ToString("F6")); 
                              outputFile.WriteLine(output); 
                            } 
 
                            if (counter == (sampleRateInSeconds - 1)) 
                            { 
                                counter = 0; 
                                continue; 
                            } 
 
                            counter++; 
                        } 
 
                    } 
                } 
            } 
 
        } 
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Appendix F: CEI-715 
 
The Condor Engineering® CEI-715 is a PC Card (PCMCIA) interface that provides 12 
fully independent ARINC 429 channels. This PC Card was used to read all ARINC 
messages output by the MMR. 
 
 
Figure F1 Condor Engineering CEI-715 
